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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the Court wanted a "second look" at the case and im-
plemented its desire by granting the reargument. Regardless, the
rule still stands that reargument will not, and should not, be granted
for the unique purpose of permitting the court to change its opinion.27
Concededly, if the Court were only taking a "second look," the
concept of reargument would seem to take on new meaning. The
result of this new concept might be to prolong litigation rather than
to seek its termination. The general rule, however, that reargument
should not be sought with undue optimism undoubtedly prevails,
even though the instant case could easily be read otherwise.2 8
M
TAXATION - TRANSFERRED PROPERTY HELD INCLUDIBLE IN
GROSS ESTATE WHERE GRANTOR RETAINED RIGHT TO INCOME.-
Petitioners-executors appealed from a decision of the Tax Court
which had approved inclusion in the gross estate of decedent the
value of income-producing property conveyed by him to his children
some ten years prior to his death. At the time of the conveyance it
had been orally agreed that the grantor was to retain for life the in-
come from the property. This agreement was carried out. In affirm-
ing the decision of the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that decedent actually enjoyed the property until death
by receipt of the income irrespective of the enforceability of any right
to it under state law. McNichol's Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1959).
The case was decided under Section 811(c) (1) (B) of the 1939
Code,' presently found in Section 2036 of the 1954 Code, the Court
27 1 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLoPEDIA OF NEw YORK PRACTicc 681 (1952).
28 COHEN & KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 696
(rev. ed. 1952).
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 3, § 811, 53 Stat. 120 (now INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, § 2036), the pertinent part of which reads:
"§811. Gross Estate
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or per-
sonal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situ-
ated outside of the United States.
(c) Transfers in contemplation of, or taking effect at, death.
(1) General rule.
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or
otherwise. ...
(B) under which he has retained for his life or for any period not
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placing decedent's transferral within that category of conveyances in
which the transferror retains "the possession or enjoyment of, or
the right to the income, from the property" thereby subjecting it to
inclusion in his gross estate. The unique aspect of the case is fur-
nished by the Court's view of the fact that according to Pennsylvania
law, the right to income was apparently unenforceable. 2 Although
it was stated that the right was not necessarily unenforceable since
decedent could have enforced it upon grantee's admission of its ex-
istence,3 such an admission was hardly likely in an action between
disputing parties. As a practical matter, the possibility of enforce-
ment was discarded, 4 and it was concluded that the over-all transac-
tion, viewed objectively, amounted in fact to retention of "the ...
enjoyment of ... the property" within the meaning of the statute.5
Until now, the nature and degree of interest retained was for
the most part the center of controversy in litigation involving these
allegedly incomplete transferrals. 6 Enforceability either existed in
ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which doe,;
not in fact end with his death (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or
the right to the income from, the property, or (ii) the right, either alone
or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall
possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom. .. ."
2 McNichol's Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1959).
3 Id. at 670 n.3.
4Id. at 671. The Court rejected the contention forwarded by petitioner
that the words "right to" added in 1932 were meant to limit the application of
the statute to only enforceable claims to the income. It was pointed out that
those words were in fact meant to extend the application of that clause to
those situations where decedent, although never receiving the income himself,
had a right to it.
5Ibid. See Wells-Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United States, 80
F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1948), in which the court held that a transfer of
property, although absolute under California law, in effect resulted in a with-
holding of possession or enjoyment until grantor's death, since decedent re-
tained absolute control of the property and received the income therefrom,
and was therefore includible in decedent's estate. The conveyance was between
husband and wife. But see, Estate of Edgar M. Uhl, 25 T.C. 22 (1955),
where the court, in holding includible property conveyed into trust with re-
tention of a right to $100 per month, and additional amounts payable in the
discretion of the trustee, relied heavily on the fact that decedent could have
enjoyed the full income by merely borrowing heavily. The court reasoned
that since creditors could enforce their claims against the entire income, it
was includible. Rather than rely on the fact that decedent could possibly
exercise control over a self-appointed trustee, the court apparently went to
great lengths to find a legally enforceable means of enjoyment.
6 For example, possibility of reverter. Compare Commissioner v. Nathan's
Estate, 159 F2d 546 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948) (Right
to income was reversionary--effective only after death of life tenant. Held,
includible, by construing Section 811(c) in conformity to Treasury Regulation
105 which had been promulgated in 1937.) with Nichols v. Bradley's Estate,
27 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1928) (Contingent life estate held non-includible.).
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fact or was presumed to exist. Here, however, "substance" rather
than "form" was held controlling. 7
This decision is in accord with efforts to eliminate tax avoidance
through the use of cleverly devised incomplete property transfers.
May v. Heiner,8 decided in 1930, interrupted an otherwise relatively
uniform policy of inclusion.9 That case, however, prompted im-
mediate legislative action to remedy the situation created by its
holding,10 which barred the levy of an estate tax on property ap-
parently on the sole basis of technical title passage during the lifetime
of decedent." These 1931 and 1932 amendments by the legislature
aimed at correcting the May decision 12 are substantially retained in
both the 1939 13 and 1954 14 Codes.
Commissioner v. Estate of Church,15 decided in 1949, expressly
7 McNichol's Estate v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir. 1959).
8 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
9 See Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949). With
reference to the includibility of trust property in settlors' estates where they
had retained a life income, the Court in Church stated: "This principle of
estate tax law was so well settled in 1928, that the United States Court of
Appeals decided May v. Heiner in favor of the Government in a one-sentence
per curiam opinion. 32 F.2d 1017. Nevertheless, March 2, 1931, this Court
followed May v. Heiner in three cases in per curulan opinions, thus upsetting
the century-old historic meaning and the long standing Treasury interpretation
of the 'possession or enjoyment' clause." Id. at 639.
The three cases referred to by the Court, which were the immediate
prompters of the legislation, were: Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S.
782; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783; McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784.
all decided on March 2, 1931.
10 The amendments added in 1931 and 1932, pertinent to the instant situa-
tion, are contained in section 811 to which reference previously was made.
The 1932 amendment [47 Stat. 279 (1932)] added "the right to" the income
to the 1931 amendment [46 Stat. 1516 (1931)] which had included only reten-
tion of "the income" from transferred property in order to include it in de-
cedent's estate. Both were amendments to the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27,
§ 302(c), 44 Stat. 70 (1926).
11 May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930). Decedent had retained a right to
a life income if her husband, trustee/beneficiary, predeceased her.
"The transfer . . . was not made in contemplation of death. . . . It was
not testamentary in character and was beyond recall by the decedent. At the
death of Mrs. May no interest in the property held under the trust deed
passed from her to the living; title thereto had been definitely fixed by the
trust deed. The interest therein which she possessed immediately prior to her
death was obliterated by that event." Id. at 243.
12 The Court in the instant case treats Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531
(1927), in which property was conveyed with an understanding that the
grantor-decedent would enjoy the premises as long as she and her husband
desired, similarly to the May case. Although it is true that emphasis was
placed on title passage, there was also reliance on the fact that "the decedent
had no valid agreement to that effect." Thus, the case, although under the
earlier statute and before the 1931 and 1932 amendments, is less easily dis-
tinguished than the decision indicates.
13 INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 3, § 811(c) (1) (B), 53 Stat. 120.
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036.
15335 U.S. 632 (1949).
[ VOL. 34
RECENT DECISIONS
overruled May v. Heiner 16 and held includible in decedents' estates
transfers made before 1931 with the right to income retained. Con-
gress then followed with the Technical Changes Acts of 194917 and
1953 18 which precluded the application of that decision to pre-1931
and certain pre-1932 transfers. Today, post-1932 transfers are gov-
erned apparently by present Section 2036 of the Code as construed
by Church.
The attitude of the Court in McNichol's toward the possibility
that the right possessed by decedent was enforceable is much the
same as that embraced by the Supreme Court in Rutkin 'v. United
States.19 Although in that case Rutkin was under a legal obligation
to return extorted funds, the Court felt that it would be naive to
base its decision on such a remote possibility. The extorted funds
were therefore held includible as gross income to petitioner. 20 In
the present case, the relation of the parties, the treatment of the prop-
erty by decedent and the fact that he actually did receive the income,
led to the inescapable conclusion that he effectively retained the en-
joyment of the property. The validity of this conclusion that a con-
trary decision based on the possibility of the loss of such a right of
doubtful enforceability would be unrealistic, turns on the extent to
which the Court's attitude towards the enforceability of rights will
be applied. Although in the instant case there seems to be little doubt
that decedent enjoyed the property within the spirit, if not the letter
of the statute, application to situations less apparent appear objec-
tionable. It is difficult to determine the controlling factors in the
instant case in order to establish a rule applicable to unenforceable
rights which will effect inclusion of property in decedent's gross
estate. The many factors that entered into the Court's decision make
such a task relatively impossible.21
16 Note 11 supra.
17 63 Stat. 895 (1949).
1867 Stat. 623 (1953), 26 U.S.C. §2036 (1958).
19343 U.S. 130 (1952).
20 The decision was five to four. The dissent felt that it was a thinly
veiled attempt to enforce local criminal law rather than a legitimate exercise
of the taxing power. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 139 (1952)
(dissenting opinion).
21 On the one hand the Court states: "And when filial devotion and re-
spect in fact justifies the faith which a parent reposes in his children in
transferring property to them upon their oral assurance that the income is to
be his for life, it is entirely artificial to hold that the parent did not retain
the enjoyment of the property until his death simply because his receipt of its
income accrued under an oral agreement rather than one more formal in
nature . . ." which appears to limit the holding to its facts, but then quotes
with favor the following statement from the Church case: "[A]n estate tax
cannot be avoided by a gift unless it is '.. . a bona fide transfer in which the
settlor, absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations,
parts with all of his title and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment
of the transferred property . . ." which would appear to indicate an ex-
tremely liberal approach to inclusion. McNichol's v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d
667, 673 (3d Cir. 1959).
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Perhaps, legislation would provide the solution. It is felt, how-
ever, that in an area such as this, where it is the over-all effect of a
transaction that determines its treatment, pronouncement through
case law of general principles to be applied and promulgation of in-
terpretive regulations are preferable to any statutory attempt to spell
out the innumerable variations which would result in includibility.
)X
TORTS-LIBEL-STATEMENTS OF LESSER GOVERNMENT OFFI-
CIAL HELD ABSOLUTELY PRIviLEG.-Petitioner, as Acting Director
of the Office of Rent Stabilization, issued a defamatory press release
regarding suspension of two officers of the department. The release,
which named the officers, intimated that they had acted irregularly
in proposing a leave payment plan. The lower court, in remanding
for new trial, found the press release qualifiedly privileged but re-
fused to grant immunity because of petitioner's malice. Petitioner
requested certiorari on the question of absolute privilege. Held, the
statement was absolutely privileged. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959).
Defamation, an attack upon an individual's good name and repu-
tation, is historically divided into libel and slander. The former in-
cludes variously written forms of defamatory matter, the latter
concerns oral statements.1 "Libellous per se" connotes that the ex-
istence of damage to a plaintiff is a necessary result of the publication
of the libel. This view also encompasses those publications, which
although not defamatory on their face, require extrinsic facts to
establish their defamatory meaning.2
In a defamation action, there are available to the defendant two
absolute defenses, privilege and truth. The former defense is further
subdivided into absolute and qualified, or conditional privilege.
Etymologically and practically, absolute privilege, conferring im-
munity 3 on the tortfeasor without regard to his purpose, or reason-
ableness of conduct, is a complete defense.4 Therefore, it is usually
limited in its availability to judicial 5 and legislative proceedings, 6
1 PROSSER, TORTS § 93 (2d ed. 1955).
2 Id. § 92, at 582.
3 On use of the terms "privilege" and "immunity" see Veeder, Absoltte
Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 CoLUm. L. REv. 463, 467-69
(1909).
4 PROSSEa, op. cit. supra note 1, § 95 at 607.
5 See generally Veeder, supra note 3.
6 See generally Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative
and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUm. L. Rv. 131 (1910).
